What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this new collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers currently working in this field explore the controversies surrounding Gauthier's position. Several essays argue against influential conceptions of preference, while others suggest that received conceptions of rational action misidentify the normative significance of rules and practices. This collection will be of particular interest to philosophers of social theory and to reflective social scientists in such fields as economics, political science and psychology.

List of contributors; 1. Practical reason and preference Christopher W. Morris and Arthur Ripstein; 2. What do expressions of preference express? Robert Brandom; 3. Preference Arthur Ripstein; 4. Rational temptation Claire Finkelstein; 5. Bombs and coconuts, or rational irrationality Derek Parfit; 6. Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values? John Broome; 7. Two forms of practical generality Michael Thompson; 8. Psychology for cooperators Adam Morton; 9. Which games should constrained maximizers play? Peter Danielson; 10. The strategy of cooperation Edward F. McClennen; 11. We were never in paradise Candace Vogler.