Bültmann & Gerriets
Preventing Regulatory Capture
Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It
von Daniel Carpenter, David A. Moss
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Gebundene Ausgabe
ISBN: 978-1-107-03608-6
Erschienen am 16.12.2013
Sprache: Englisch
Format: 235 mm [H] x 157 mm [B] x 35 mm [T]
Gewicht: 1004 Gramm
Umfang: 530 Seiten

Preis: 80,50 €
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Klappentext
Inhaltsverzeichnis

Leading scholars from across the social sciences present empirical evidence that the obstacle of regulatory capture is more surmountable than previously thought.



Introduction Daniel Carpenter and David Moss; Part I. Failures of Capture Scholarship: 1. A revisionist history of regulatory capture William Novak; 2. The concept of regulatory capture: a short, inglorious history Richard Posner; 3. Detecting and measuring capture Daniel Carpenter; Part II. New Conceptions of Capture - Mechanisms and Outcomes: 4. Cultural capture and the financial crisis James Kwak; 5. Complexity, capacity, and capture Nolan McCarty; 6. Preventing economists' capture Luigi Zingales; 7. Corrosive capture? The dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation Daniel Carpenter; Part III. Misdiagnosing Capture and Case Studies of Regulatory Success: 8. Capturing history: the case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 David Moss and Jonathan Lackow; 9. Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture: evidence from coal mine safety regulation Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer; 10. Captured by disaster? Reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill Christopher Carrigan; 11. Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking Susan Webb Yackee; 12. Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar; Part IV. The Possibility of Preventing Capture: 13. Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs: some evidence from insurance regulation Daniel Schwarcz; 14. Courts and regulatory capture M. Elizabeth Magill; 15. Can executive review help prevent capture? Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore; Conclusion David Moss and Daniel Carpenter; Afterword Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach.


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