Delegation is an ubiquitous social phenomenon linked to the growing differentiation of modern societies. Delegation is one of several different modes of organisation that exist to make collective action successful, but has been overlooked and under-researched.
Using a rational choice institutional analysis and principal agent models, this book brings literature on delegation to bureaucracy, electorate to legislature to government within representative democracy together with literature on new forms of delegation such as non-majoritarian institutions, to provide a more complete and synthetic analysis of delegation in political systems.
With a broad and comparative approach, this is an important volume for advanced students, researchers and professionals concerned with delegation in the areas of public policy, public administration and democratic theory.

Fabrizio Gilardi, Dietmar Braun

Preface 1. Delegation in Contemporary Democracies: Introduction Part 1: The Standard Chain of Delegation 2. The (Moral) Hazards of Parliamentary Democracy 3. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies: Smallness, Proximity and Shortcuts 4. A Theory of Efficient Delegation 5. A Delegation Theory for Explaining the Bureaucratization of Public Administrations Part 2: The Next Steps of Delegation: Independent Agencies, Interest Organizations and the European Union 6. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Diffusion 7. Delegation in the distributive policy arena: the case of research policy 8. Consequences of Legitimising Independent Regulatory Agencies in Contemporary Democracies: Theoretical Scenarios 9. Whose Agents? Non-Governmental Organizations in Policy-Proposing Commissions: Agents of Government or Opposition Parties? 10. Delegation in the European Union: Debates and Research Agenda 11. Delegation in Contemporary Democracies: Concluding Remarks