Morality seems to play a special role in human life distinct from conventional norms, like those of etiquette, or simple preferences based on subjective tastes. There are various theories of the foundations of morality, some of which treat morality as "subjective" in an important way. "Moral realism" is however a family of theories that take morality to have an objective factual basis, such that morality is not "up to us" and is not "under our control". The contributions in this Oxford Handbook explore the central ideas and themes constituting moral realism and defend particular views about it.

Paul Bloomfield is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut and works on issues in moral philosophy and metaphysics. He is the author of Moral Reality (2001), Morality and Self-Interest (2008), and The Virtues of Happiness (2014).
David Copp is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at the University of California, Davis. He is author of Morality, Normativity, and Society (1995) and Morality in a Natural World (2007), and he has edited several anthologies, including The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (2006). He is editor of a monograph series with OUP called "Oxford Moral Theory."

• Introduction


• Paul Bloomfield and David Copp


• I. ABOUT MORAL REALISM AND ITS VARIETIES


• 1. Defining Moral Realism


• Jennifer Foster and Mark Schroeder


• 2. Metaphysical Structure for Moral Realists


• Tristram McPherson


• 3. Moral Realism and Objectivity


• Sigrún Svavarsdóttir


• 4. Epistemology for Realists


• Sarah McGrath


• 5. The Bearing of Moral Rationalism on Moral Realism


• Michael Smith


• 6. Does Anything We Care About Distinguish the Non-Natural from the Natural?


• Mark van Roojen


• 7. Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In Between


• Ralph Wedgwood


• 8. Can a Moral Judgment be Moorean?


• William Lycan


• 9. Real Ethics


• Simon Blackburn


• II. NATURALISM


• 10. Ethical Naturalism: Problems and Prospects


• Louise Antony and Ernesto Garcia


• 11. Ethical Realism and Robust Normativity


• David Copp


• 12. Moral Functionalism


• Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit


• 13. Function, Fitness, Flourishing


• Paul Bloomfield


• 14. Realism about the Good-For Human Beings


• L. Nandi Theunissen


• III. NON-NATURALISM


• 15. Moral Conceptual Truths


• John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, and Russ Shafer-Landau


• 16. Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments against Robust Moral Realism


• Joshua Schecter


• 17. The Explanatory Roles of Moral Facts and the Case for Moral Realism


• Robert Audi


• 18. Derek Parfit's Non-Naturalist Cognitivism


• Roger Crisp


• 19. Ardent Moral Realism and the Value-Laden World


• William J. FitzPatrick


• 20. Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed!


• David Enoch and Itamar Weinshtock-Saadon


• IV. NEITHER NATURALISM NOR NON-NATURALISM


• 21. Response-Dependent Realism


• Mark LeBar


• 22. Deflationary Meta-ethics


• Paul Horwich


• 23. On the Properties of Quietism and Robustness


• Matthew H. Kramer


• 24. Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism


• Mark D. Warren and Amie L. Thomasson


• 25. Moral Anti-Exceptionalism


• Timothy Williamson