Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Frabk Jackson, Joseph Levine, Laurence Nemirow, David Papineau, John Hawthorne, and five others.

• Introduction


• Part 1: Phenomenal Knowledge


• 1: Daniel Dennet, Tufts University: What RoboMary Knows


• 2: Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham and Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits and Estate Group: So This is What it's Like: a Defense of the Ability Hypothesis


• 3: Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand Institut International de Philosophie: The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism


• 4: Torin Alter, The University of Alabama: Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?


• 5: Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor Communications, Research and Development: What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know about Color?


• Part 2: Phenomenal Concepts


• 6: Janet Levin, University of Southern California: What is a Phenomenal Concept?


• 7: David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University: Phenomenal and Perceptual Conepts


• 8: Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst: Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint


• 9: David Chalmers, Australian National University: Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap


• 10: John Hawthorne, Rutgers University: Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia


• 11: Stephen White, Tufts University: Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise


• 12: Ned Block, New York University: Max Black's Objection to Mind-Brain Identity


• 13: Martine Nida-R:umelin, University of Fribourg: Grasping Phenomenal Properties