Mark Siderits works primarily in analytic Asian philosophy. He retired from Seoul National University in 2012, but now lectures occasionally at Kyoto University. His research interests lie in the intersection between classical Indian philosophy on the one hand, and analytic metaphysics and philosophy of language on the other. Among his more recent publications are: Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons, 2nd edition, and, together with Shoryu Katsura, Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika. A collection of his papers on Buddhist philosophy, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy, was published by Oxford in 2016.

• Chapter 1: Introduction


• Chapter 2: Non-Self I


• Chapter 3: Non-Self II


• Chapter 4: Fundamental Ontology


• Chapter 5: Causation


• Chapter 6: Buddhist Nominalism


• Chapter 7: Time


• Chapter 8: The External World


• Chapter 9: The Internal World


• Chapter 10: Anti-realisms Local and Global


• References

It is widely known that Buddhists deny the existence of the self. However, Buddhist philosophers defend interesting positions on a variety of other issues of fundamental ontology. In particular, they have important things to say about ontological reduction, and about the nature of the causal relation. Amidst the prolonged debate over global anti-realism, Buddhist philosophers devised an innovative approach to the radical nominalist denial of all universals and real resemblances. While some defend presentism, others propound eternalism. In How Things Are, Mark Siderits presents the arguments that Buddhist philosophers developed on these and other issues.