The potential conflicts between morality and self-interest lies at the heart of ethics. However, moral philosophers sometimes think of their task as trying to gain knowledge simply of what we are morally required to do, leaving aside the larger normative question of what we ought to do all things considered, while others have assumed that what we ought to do all things considered just is what we morally ought to do. Sagdahl grapples with the more fundamental question of what we ought to do all things considered, but argues that there may be no simple answer to this question.

Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl is Associate Professor in philosophy at the Arctic University of Norway, in Tromsø. She did her Ph.D. at the University of Oslo, while also being an academic visitor at Oxford University. Her main work has been in metaethics on the topic of normative pluralism, but she also works on meaning in life, military conscription, and feminist philosophy, in particular transgender issues.

• Chapter 1: Introduction


• Chapter 2: Structures of Normativity and the Concept of 'Ought'


• Chapter 3: The Grounding and Extent of Normative Pluralism


• Chapter 4: Incommensurability, Rationality, and Choice


• Chapter 5: The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons


• Chapter 6: The Supremacy Challenge


• Chapter 7: The Codification Challenge


• Chapter 8: Conclusion and Integration


• References