In this volume, Declan Smithies argues that consciousness has unique epistemic significance in the sense that only conscious creatures have epistemic justification to know anything about the world. In other words, all epistemic justification depends ultimately on consciousness.

Declan Smithies is Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University. He works primarily on issues at the intersection between epistemology and the philosophy of mind. He is co-editor of Introspection and Consciousness (OUP 2012) and Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays (OUP 2011).

• 0.0: Introduction
  


• 0.1. What is Consciousness?


• 0.2: The Significance of Consciousness


• 0.3. The Hard Problem of Consciousness


• 0.4: Putting Consciousness First


• 0.5: An Overview of this Book


• 0.6: Chapter Summaries
  


• PART I
  


• 1: Representation
  


• 1.1: Representationalism


• 1.2: Unconscious Mental Representation


• 1.3. Grounding Representation in Consciousness


• 1.4: Grounding Thought in Consciousness


• 1.5: Grounding Epistemic Justification in Consciousness
  


• 2: Perception
  


• 2.1: Blindsight


• 2.2: Concepts of Consciousness


• 2.3: Presentational Force


• 2.4: Skeptical Scenarios


• 2.5. Duplication Scenarios


• 2.6: Conclusions
  


• 3: Cognition
  


• 3.1: The Epistemic Role of Belief


• 3.2. Beliefs and Subdoxastic States


• 3.3: Inferential Integration


• 3.4: Conscious Accessibility


• 3.5: The Cognitive Experience of Judgment


• 3.6: Conclusions
  


• 4: Introspection
  


• 4.1: The Simple Theory of Introspection


• 4.2: The Reliability Challenge


• 4.3: Rationality and Self-Knowledge


• 4.4: The Scope Question


• 4.5: The Role of Conscious Judgment


• 4.6: Conclusions
  


• 5: Mentalism
  


• 5.1: Evidentialism


• 5.2: Mentalism


• 5.3: Phenomenal Mentalism


• 5.4: The Phenomenal Conception of Evidence


• 5.5: The Explanatory Challenge
  


• PART II
  


• 6: Accessibilism
  


• 6.1: What is Accessibilism?


• 6.2: Explaining Accessibilism


• 6.3: Clairvoyance and Super-Blindsight


• 6.4: The New Evil Demon Problem


• 6.5: Answering the Explanatory Challenge
  


• 7: Reflection
  


• 7.1: Justification and Reflection


• 7.2: An Argument from Reflection


• 7.3: The Over-Intellectualization Problem


• 7.4: The Regress Problem


• 7.5: The Empirical Problem


• 7.6: The Value Problem


• 7.7: Conclusions
  


• 8: Epistemic Akrasia
  


• 8.1: What is Epistemic Akrasia?


• 8.2: An Argument from Epistemic Akrasia


• 8.3: Moore's Paradox


• 8.4: Knowledge as the Aim of Belief


• 8.5: Justification and Reflection
  


• 9: Higher-Order Evidence
  


• 9.1: A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia


• 9.2: Solving the Puzzle


• 9.3: The Certainty Argument


• 9.4: Ideally Rational Agents


• 9.5: Rational Dilemmas


• 9.6: Epistemic Idealization
  


• 10: Luminosity
  


• 10.1: Luminosity Defined


• 10.2: The Problem of the Speckled Hen


• 10.3: The Anti-Luminosity Argument


• 10.4: Epistemic Iteration Principles


• 10.5: The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock


• 10.6: What's at Stake?
  


• 11: Conclusion
  


• 11.1: Phenomenal Conservatism


• 11.2: Seemings


• 11.3: Problems about Evidence


• 11.4: Problems about Evidential Support


• 11.5: Phenomenal Accessibilism


• 11.6: Conclusions