Miranda Fricker is Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College.

• Preface


• Introduction


• 1: Testimonial Injustice


• 2: Prejudice In The Credibility Economy


• 3: Towards A Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony


• 4: The Virtue of Testimonial Justice


• 5: The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice


• 6: Original Significances: The Wrong Revisited


• 7: Hermeneutical Injustice


• Conclusion


• Index

Epistemic Injustice explores a form of injustice which has so far been largely ignored in English-language philosophy: epistemic injustice - that is to say, a wrong suffered in one's capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In connection with both, she argues that our testimonial sensibility needs to incorporate a corrective, anti-prejudicial virtue that can be used to promote a more veridical and a more democratic epistemic practice.