This book addresses the retributive and "orthodox subjectivist" theories that dominate criminal justice theory alongside recent "revisionist" and "postmodern" approaches. Norrie argues that all these approaches, together with their faults and contradictions, stem from their orientation to themes in Kantian moral philosophy. He explores an alternative relational or dialectical approach; examines the work of Ashworth, Duff, Fletcher, Moore, Smith, and Williams; and considers key doctrinal issues.

• 1: Criminal Justice after Kant


• I. THEORETICAL APPROACHES


• 2: The Limits of Kantian Justice


• 3: Critique of Criminal Justice


• 4: A Dialectical Approach


• II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING


• 5: Individualizing Blame


• 6: 'Contextualizing' Blame


• 7: Legalizing Blame I. The Quest for the General Part


• 8: Legalizing Blame II: Doctrinal Problems in the General Part


• III. AFTER KANT: THE BLAMING RELATION


• 9: Relationizing Blame


• 10: Conclusion

Alan Norrie is Edmund Davies Professor of Criminal Law and Justice at Kings College, London