Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial intelligence. It elaborates on the relevant theories and provides a mathematically precise foundation for the thesis that large parts of theoretical reason can be subsumed under practical reason.

• 0: Overview


• 1: Doxastic States and Their Representation


• 2: Epistemology and Belief Change


• 3: Changing Doxastic States: Two Complementary Perspectives


• 4: Concepts of Theoretical Rationality: Postulates for Belief Change and Nonmonotonic Reasoning


• 5: Foundational Belief Change Using Nonmonotonic Inference


• 6: A General Concept of Practical Rationality: Constraints for Coherent Choice


• 7: Coherentist Belief Change as a Problem of Rational Choice


• 8: Revealed Preferences: Understanding the Theory of Epistemic Entrenchment


• Appendices A; B; C; D; E


• References/Bibliography


• Index of Symbols


• Index of Names


• Subject Index

Professor Hans Rott,
Dept of Philosophy
University of Regensburg
93040 Regensburg
Germany.