This volume draws together Richard Joyce's work from the last decade on moral skepticism, the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. Joyce's radical view is that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with the properties and relations necessary to render such judgments true.

• Introduction: 'Morality: The evolution of a myth'


• Part 1. Error Theory


• 1: Expressivism, motivation, internalism, and Hume


• 2: Morality, schmorality


• 3: The accidental error theorist


• 4: Metaethical pluralism: How both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions


• Part 2. Evolution and debunking


• 5: The origins of moral judgment


• 6: The many moral nativisms


• 7: Evolution, truth-tracking, and moral skepticism


• 8: Irrealism and the genealogy of morals


• Part 3: Projectivism and fictionalism


• 9: Patterns of objectification


• 10: Is moral projectivism empirically tractable?


• 11: Moral fictionalism


• 12: Psychological fictionalism, and the threat of fictionalist suicide


• References


• Index

Richard Joyce is Professor of Philosophy at the Victoria University of Wellington. He received his PhD from Princeton University in 1998, and since then has taught and researched at universities in England, Australia, and New Zealand. He is the author of The Myth of Morality (CUP, 2001) and The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), as well as numerous articles and book chapters on metaethics and moral psychology.