Bültmann & Gerriets
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6
von David Shoemaker
Verlag: OUP Oxford
Gebundene Ausgabe
ISBN: 978-0-19-884553-9
Erschienen am 01.11.2019
Sprache: Englisch
Format: 222 mm [H] x 145 mm [B] x 20 mm [T]
Gewicht: 518 Gramm
Umfang: 304 Seiten

Preis: 97,10 €
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Klappentext
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Biografische Anmerkung

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as:
DT What does it mean to be an agent?
DT What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)?
DT What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will?
DT What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility?
DT How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility?
DT What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility?
OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.



  • Introduction

  • 1: Douglas W. Portmore: Control, Attitudes, and Accountability

  • 2: Jeanette Kennett and Jessica Wolfendale: Self-Control and Moral Security

  • 3: Eric Wiland: (En)Joining Others

  • 4: Angela M. Smith: Who's Afraid of a Little Resentment?

  • 5: Andreas Brekke Carlsson: Shame and Attributability

  • 6: A.G. Gorman: The Minimal Approval Account of Attributability

  • 7: Elizabeth Harman: Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far

  • 8: Michael S. Moore: Contemporary Neuroscience's Epiphenomenal Challenge to Responsibility

  • 9: Travis Timmerman and Philip Swenson: How to be an Actualist and Blame People

  • 10: Elinor Mason: Between Strict Liability and Blameworthy Quality of Will: Taking Responsibility

  • 11: Matt King: Skepticism About the Standing to Blame



David Shoemaker is Professor of Philosophy at the Murphy Institute at Tulane University. He is the author or co-author of two books and thirty-five articles, many of them having to do with the issues of agency, responsibility, and personal identity.


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