What should we do when autonomy and rationality seem to be in conflict in medical decision-making, as when there seems no good reason for a patient's wishes? Jonathan Pugh offers a new framework for thinking about the concept of autonomy, grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play.

• Introduction


• 1: Four Distinctions Concerning Rationality


• 2: Rationality and Decisional Autonomy


• 3: Controlling Influences


• 4: Coercion


• 5: The Practical Dimension of Autonomy


• 6: Informed Consent, Autonomy, and Beliefs


• 7: Rational Autonomy and Decision-Making Capacity


• 8: Rational Decision-Making Capacity in End of Life Decision-Making


• 9: The Prudential Value of Autonomy


• Concluding Remarks

Jonathan Pugh is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Applied Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford and Manager of the Visiting Programme for the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. His research interests lie primarily in issues concerning personal autonomy in practical ethics, particularly topics pertaining to informed consent. He has also written on the ethics of human embryonic stem cell research, criminal justice, human enhancement, gene-editing, and neuroethics.