The two dominant theories of consciousness argue it appeared in living beings either suddenly, or gradually. Both theories face problems. The solution is the realization that a foundational consciousness was always here, yet varying conscious states were not, and appeared gradually. Michael Tye explores this idea and the key questions it raises.

Michael Tye is the Dallas TACA Centennial Professor in Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. He has taught at Temple University, St Andrews, and King's College, London. His main area of interest is consciousness, and he has also written on mental imagery, the nature of thought, and vagueness. He is the author of Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs (OUP, 2016).

• Introduction


• 1: A Paradox of Consciousness


• 2: Russellian Monism to the Rescue?


• 3: Transparency and Representationalism


• 4: Representationalism and Panpsychism


• 5: The Location of Consciousness


• Bibliography