Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason, and they articulate and defend a unified framework for thinking about those issues. The volume also features a helpful new introduction.

• I. Reason, Desire, and the Will


• 1: How to Argue about Practical Reason


• 2: Three Conceptions of Rational Agency


• 3: Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons


• 4: Normativity and the Will


• 5: Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason


• II. Responsibility, Identification, and Emotion


• 6: Reason and Responsibility


• 7: Moral Responsibility and the Practical Point of View


• 8: Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections


• 9: Caring, Reflexivity, and the Structure of Volition


• 10: Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche's Slave Revolt


• III. Morality and Other Normative Domains


• 11: Virtue, Reason, and Principle


• 12: Scanlon's Contractualism


• 13: The Rightness of Acts and the Goodness of Lives


• 14: Moral Reasons and Moral Fetishes: Rationalists and Anti-Rationalists on Moral Motivation