In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.

• Contributors


• Introduction


• Part I


• 1. How to Insult a Philosopher


• Michael Ridge


• 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics


• Daniel Boisvert


• 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions and Moral Motivation


• David Copp


• 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language: Noncognitive Type-Generality


• Ryan Hay


• 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism


• Jon Tresan


• 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement


• Stephen Finlay


• 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.


• John Eriksson


• Part II


• 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature


• Guy Fletcher


• 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature


• Stephen Barker


• 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?


• Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias


• 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment


• Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter


• 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics


• Mark Schroeder


• Bibliography


• Index

Guy Fletcher is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh.
Michael Ridge is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.