Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content, according to which the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. He explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.

Peter Hanks is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota. His research is in philosophy of language and the history of analytic philosophy.

• Acknowledgements


• Introduction


• 1: Three pictures of content


• 2: The problem of the unity of the proposition


• 3: Predication and unity


• 4: Cancellation and the content-force distinction


• 5: Proper names and types of reference acts


• 6: Empty names


• 7: Propositional attitude reports


• 8: First-person propositions


• 9: Asking and ordering


• Conclusion


• References


• Index