Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.

• 1: Introductory Overview: The Role of Indexicality, Perspective and the De Se in Philosophy


• 2: Preliminaries: Language-Mind, Super Indexicals, and Opacity


• 3: Indexicality, the De Se, and Agency


• 4: Indexicality, Opacity, and Fregeanism


• 5: Lewis on the De Se, Self-Ascription, and Centered Worlds


• 6: Functionalism to the Rescue?


• 7: Indexicality and Immunity to Error


• 8: A Brief Note on Perceptual Content and the De Se


• 9: The De Se and the Semantics of PRO Constructions


• 10: The View From Everywhere

Herman Cappelen is a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews, where he works at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of many papers and four books: Insensitive Semantics (with Ernest Lepore; Blackwell, 2004), Language Turned on Itself (with Ernest Lepore; OUP, 2007), Relativism and Monadic Truth (with John Hawthorne; OUP, 2009), and Philosophy without Intuitions (OUP, 2012).
; Josh Dever is Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He completed his PhD at the University of California at Berkeley, and his primary research interests include philosophy of language and philosophical logic.