• 1: Introduction


• 2: David Shoemaker: The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation


• 3: Sarah Buss: The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation


• 4: Michael E. Bratman: The Fecundity of Planning Agency


• 5: Luca Ferrero: Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? Intentions and the Own Action Condition


• 6: Daniel Jacobson: Regret, Agency, and Error


• 7: Oisín Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols: Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency


• 8: Michael McKenna: Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms


• 9: Paul Russell: Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System'


• 10: Zac Cogley: The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions


• 11: Matthew Talbert: Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame


• 12: Tamler Sommers: Partial Desert


• 13: Heidi L. Maibom: Values, Sanity, and Responsibility


• 14: David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin: Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility


• Index

David Shoemaker is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Murphy Institute at Tulane University. He is the author or co-author of two books and thirty-five articles, many of them having to do with the issues of agency, responsibility, and personal identity.

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action?