This book is a collection of new essays on the libertarian position on free will and related issues that focuses specifically on the views of philosopher Robert Kane. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers, the essays range from various areas of philosophy including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind.

• Acknowledgements


• Contributors


• 1. Free will, libertarianism, and Kane


• David Palmer


• Part I: Libertarian Theories of Free Will


• 2. Can an indeterministic cause leave a choice up to the agent?


• Carl Ginet


• 3. Free will and metaphysics


• Timothy O'Connor


• Part II: The Luck Objection


• 4. Kane, luck, and control: Trying to get by without too much effort


• Alfred Mele


• 5. Toward a solution to the luck problem


• John Martin Fischer


• Part III: Incompatibilism and Omissions


• 6. Compatibilist ultimacy: Resisting the threat of Kane's U condition


• Michael McKenna


• 7. The direct argument for incompatibilism


• David Widerker and Ira M. Schnall


• 8. Freedom, responsibility, and omitting to act


• Randolph Clarke


• Part IV: The Significance of Free Will


• 9. Responsibility for emotions, alternative possibilities, and reasons


• Ishtiyaque Haji


• 10. Moral responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and the significance of


• (libertarian) free will


• Dana Kay Nelkin


• 11. The dialectic of selfhood and the significance of free will


• Derk Pereboom


• Part V: Kane's Reply


• 12. New arguments in debates on libertarian free will: Responses to contributors


• Robert Kane


• References


• Index

David Palmer is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Tennessee. He specializes in ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of action. He has published on the topics of free will, moral responsibility, and applied ethics.