Declan Smithies is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University and was until recently Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy at the Australian National University. He received his BA in Philosophy and Theology from the University of Oxford and his PhD in Philosophy from New York University. He works on a range of issues in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, including consciousness, intentionality, concepts, perception, introspection, attention, belief, justification, and knowledge.
Daniel Stoljar is Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He received his BA from the University of Sydney and his PhD from MIT. He works on a range of issues in philosophy of mind, metaethics, epistemology and metaphysics.

I. Skepticism about Introspection
1. Introspection, What?, Eric Schwitzgebel
2. Awareness and Authority: Skeptical Doubts About Self-Knowledge, Fred Dretske
3. Knowledge of Perception, Daniel Stoljar
II. Theories of Introspection
4. Renewed Acquaintance, Brie Gertler
5. On the Phenomenology of Introspection, Charles Siewert
6. The Epistemology of Introspection, Ernest Sosa
7. Knowing What I See, Alex Byrne
8. Self-Knowledge, 'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity, Richard Moran
III. Constitutivism
9. Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief, Sydney Shoemaker
10. A Simple Theory of Introspection, Declan Smithies
11. Judgment as a Guide to Belief, Nicholas Silins
12. Discrimination and Self-Knowledge, Patrick Greenough
IV. Introspection and the Nature of Experience
13. Introspection, Explanation and Perceptual Experience: Resisting Metaphysical Disjunctivism, Aaron Zimmerman
14. Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology, Maja Spener
15. Introspection About Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Incompetence, Terry Horgan

The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa?
Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This volume aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new essays and one reprinted essay on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.