JOHN H. MAURER is Associate Professor in the Strategy Department of the U.S. Naval War College where he lectures on naval history and strategy, international history, and strategic studies. He is also the assistant editor of the journal Diplomacy and Statecraft.

Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
War Planning
The Short War Dogma
Austria-Hungary's War Plans
Prewar Military Collaboration between Austria-Hungary and Germany
The July Crisis
A Terrorist Attack in Sarajevo; Austria-Hungary and Germany Decide for War
Russia's Decision for War
Vienna and Berlin Order General Mobilization
East or West in Germany's Deployment
Britain's Decision for War
Conclusion: Why Deterrence Failed in 1914
Appendix I: Austria-Hungary's Mobilization Calendar
Appendix II: Tabular Overview of the Movement of the "B"-Staffel in 1914
Appendix III: Staabs' Deployment East
Bibliography
Index

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.