Banking Reform in India and China seeks to explore the ways in which banking reform is conditioned by a variety of institutional mechanisms. To uncover these dynamics, Saez draws primarily from analytical tools developed in modern game theory and institutional economics. He provides a multidimensional analysis that covers microeconomic, macroeconomic and institutional aspects of these two countries banking systems. It ties together three themes of corporate governance, financial deregulation and central bank independence to banking reform. These unique approaches make this an important contribution to the literature on comparative banking reform in transitional economies.

Introduction China's Banking Institutional Framework India's Banking Institutional Framework The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Repression and Reform of the Financial System in India and China Central Bank Independence: A Comparative Perspective Conclusions

LAWRENCE SAEZ is Visiting Scholar at the Centre for South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley. He specializes in economic liberalization and federalism in India. He has published work on various aspects of economic reform in India and China (including foreign investment policy, infrastructure, and privatization). He is the South Asia editor at Asian Survey.