Cimbala shows why the prevention, management, and concluding of war all require an understanding of the subjective aspects of decision making as well as the hardware and tactics of military operations. A review of past cases of U.S. security policy decision making and a preview of some future problems are combined to distill important lessons about coping with conflict in the post-Cold War world.
These lessons include the awareness that some conflicts are unnecessarily provoked or prolonged on account of the gap between the perspectives and experiences of civilian policy makers and the views of the armed forces leadership. Another important lesson is that, in resolving or managing conflicts, perceptions, and expectations of leaders filter out alternatives that might have led to preferred solutions had they been attempted in good time. Of particular interest to policy makers, military professionals, and researchers involved with contemporary military issues.

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including Armed Forces and Society.

Introduction
Past Cases
Bargaining at the Brink: Otherness and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Wilderness of Mirrors: The 1983 "War Scare" in U.S.-Soviet Relations
Operation Desert Storm: A Truncated Triumph
Present and Future Cases
Information Warfare and Nuclear Weapons: Back to the Future?
Armageddon by Osmosis: Must Nuclear Weapons Spread?
Small Wars and Peace Wars: Disarming the Devil
Conclusion