The future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in the 21st century is not entirely predictable from the Cold War past. Nor is it easy to foresee on the basis of what has happened since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Cimbala contends that nuclear weapons and the psychology of nuclear deterrence will remain important after 2000, but the character of that importance will change. No longer will nuclear weapons be the dominators of military technology. Instead, advanced technology conventional weapons, based on information and electronics, will supplant nuclear weapons as the instruments of military supremacy in the 21st century.
What, Cimbala asks, can be expected of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, given what we have learned from previous experience in the Cold War and in the 1990s? Cimbala expects that nuclear weapons will spread among currently non-nuclear states, and states with regional grievances or hegemonic aspirations will seek to deploy small nuclear forces as deterrents against neighbors or against outside intervention by the United States in regional conflicts. Regional rogue states may also obtain nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as Cimbala explains, the international balance of power is unlikely to change. As he makes clear, power will be less dependent on deployed military platforms and more dependent on information warfare. A thoughtful and provocative analysis that will be of particular interest to policy makers, scholars, and other researchers involved with arms control, security studies, and international relations.

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including Armed Forces and Society.

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Limited War in the Nuclear Age: Military Frustration and U.S. Adaptation
Marching Beyond Marx: The Red Army and Nuclear Weapons
The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its Legacy
Nuclear Policy and Strategy in the Future
Nuclear Proliferation: Fortuitous Past, Uncertain Future
Russia and Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War: A Potemkin Village?
Nuclear Weapons and "Third Wave" Warfare
Conclusion