Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting view of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early 1950s. The British, fearing an 'agonizing reappraisal' of the American defence commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When, despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in its history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Their crisis management, however, had been rooted in fear of the 'agonizing reappraisal', a danger dismissed by many historians as exaggerated but which the British, in 1954, were perhaps right to take seriously.
Dedication Acknowledgements Introduction: Agonizing Reappraisals PART I: THE CRISIS LOOMS Britain, the United States and the Rearming of Germany: October 1950 to May 1952 Anglo-American Relations and the EDC: May 1952 to December 1953 PART II: THE CRISIS BREAKS A Parting of the Ways: The Bermuda Conference and Paris NATO Council, December 1953 French Ratification of the EDC: Competing Anglo-American Approaches, January to July 1954 The Death of the EDC: July to August 1954 PART III: THE CRISIS RESOLVED Selling the Solution: British Crisis Management: August to September 1954 Anglo-American Divorce and Reconciliation: September 1954 Phoenix from the Ashes: The Birth of the Western European Union, October 1954 to May 1955 PART IV: CONCLUSION Agonizing Reappraisals: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence Bibliography Index
Kevin Ruane is Principal Lecturer in History, Canterbury Christchurch University College.