This volume highlights the complex intra-alliance politics of what was seen as the likeliest flash point of conflict in the Cold War and demonstrates how strongly determinant were concerns about relationships with allies in the choices made by all the major governments. It recounts the evolution of policy during the 1958 and 1961 Berlin crises from the perspective of each government central to the crisis, one on the margins and the military headquarters responsible for crafting an agreed Western military campaign

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Notes on Contributors Editors' Introduction; K.Schake & J.P.S.Gearson Berlin and the Cold War; L.Freedman Background to the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis; J.P.S.Gearson A Broader Range of Choice? U.S. Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crisis; K.Schake Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1959-1962; J.P.S.Gearson De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon; C.Buffet The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis; H.Harrison The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958-1962; J.Kastner Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961; L.Nuti & B.Bagnato Three Hats for Berlin: General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 1958-62; G.Pedlow Berlin Crisis Timeline

BRUNA BAGNATO Associate Professor of the History of International Relations, University of Florence
CYRIL BUFFET Political Adviser to the Chairman of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN Professor of War Studies and Head of the School of Social Sciences and Public Policy, King's College London
HOPE HARRISON Assistant Professor of History and International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington D.C.
JILL KASTNER PhD Graduate, Harvard University
LEOPOLDO NUTI Professor of the History of International Relations, University of Roma Tre
GREGORY PEDLOW Chief of the Historical Office at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO's military headquarters for Europe