This book argues for rejecting epistemic instrumentalism as a first-order view not because it suffers extensional failures, but because it suffers explanatory ones. By contrast, it argues that epistemic instrumentalism offers a natural, straightforward explanation of why being epistemically correct matters.

Nathaniel P. Sharadin is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The University of Hong Kong. He is the author of numerous articles on epistemology and ethics.

1. Introduction

2. Preliminaries

3. First-Order Epistemic Theory

4. Epistemic Correctness and the Minimal Functional Criterion

5. First-Order Epistemic Instrumentalism

6. The Functionalist Challenge

7. Second-Order Epistemic Theory

8. Second-Order Epistemic Instrumentalism

9. The Content Constraint

10. Bespoke Explanations

11. New View Old Problems

12. Going Further