Being and Worth extends recent depth-realist philosophy to the question of values. It argues that beings both in the natural and human worlds have worth in themselves, whether we recognise it or not. This view is defended through and account of the human mind as essentially concerned with that of which it is independent.
Conclusions follow both for environmental ethics - that natural beings should be valued for themselves, not just for their use to us - and for justice in the human world, based on the idea that humans are unique and equal in respect of 'having a life to live'.

Andrew Collier is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. His publications incluedR.D. Laing, Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought, Socialis Reasoning and Critical Realism. He has published many articles in Radical Philosophy and is a member of the editorial collective.

Introduction 1 Are there values independent of humankind? 2 Towards Spinozism: the cognitive paradigm of morality 3 Spinozism: the work of reason Appendix to Chapter 3: Against irrationalism 4 Beyond Spinozism: the objectivity of values 5 Problems about the worth of being 6 Away from anthropocentrism 7 The worth of human beings. Supplementary essay: authentic existence and the fullness of being