This book provides the first detailed examination in English of the Egyptian-Abyssinian War and looks at the root problems that made Ismail's soldiers ineffective, including class, racism, politics, finance, and changing military technology.

1. Diamonds in the Rough 2. Creating a Military Machine. Muhammad Ali and his Neo-Mamluks 3. "Hideous Negroes from Nubia." Egypt and the Crimean War 4. Avec sang-froid le plus rare. Said and the Mexican Adventure 5. Conscripts, Stage Villains, and Slave Soldiers. Rank and File in the Army of Khedive Ismail 6. Native Born or Mercenary? Selecting Officers for the Army of Khedive Ismail 7. Weapons Procurement Policies and the Egyptian Economy 8. The Khedive and the Sultan 9. The Imperial Road. Egyptian Expansion in the Sudan 10. Imperial Apogee. The Coming of the Egyptian-Abyssinian War 11. Descent into the Maelstrom. Egypt invades Harar, Awsa, and the Somali Coast 12. A Ridge to Far. The Gundet Campaign 13. The Abyssinian Army 14. The Gura Campaign 15. End Game, Bibliography.

John P. Dunn is an Assistant Professor of History at Valdosta State University, Georgia, USA. He studies military affairs in nineteenth century Egypt, Poland and China. His work has appeared in The Journal of Military History, War in History, and The Journal of Slavic Military Affairs.