Bültmann & Gerriets
N-Person Game Theory
Concepts and Applications
von Anatol Rapoport
Verlag: Guilford Publications
Reihe: Dover Books on Mathematics
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Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM


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ISBN: 978-0-486-14367-5
Erschienen am 17.06.2013
Sprache: Englisch
Format: 216 mm [H] x 137 mm [B]
Umfang: 332 Seiten

Preis: 23,49 €

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Inhaltsverzeichnis
Klappentext

Introduction: Some Mathematical Tools
Part I. Basic Concepts
1. Levels of Game-theoretic Analysis
2. Three-level Analysis of Elementary Games
3. Individual and Group Rationality
4. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solution
5. The Shapely Value
6. The Bargaining Set
7. The Kernel
8. Restrictions on Realignments
9. Games in Partition Function Form
10. N-Person Theory and Two-Person Theory Compared
11. Harsanyi's Bargaining Model
Part II. Applications
Introduction to Part II
12. A Small Market
13. Large Markets
14. Simple Games and Legislatures
15. Symmetric and Quota Games
16. Coalitions and Power
17. Experimetns Suggested by N-Person Game Theory
18. "So Long Sucker" : A Do-it-yourself Experiment"
19. The Behavorial Scientist's View
20. Concluding Remarks
Notes
References
Index



N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis.
Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts and models, including levels of game-theoretic analysis, individual and group rationality, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the Shapley value, the bargaining set, the kernel, restrictions on realignments, games in partition function form, and Harsanyi's bargaining model. In Part II he delves into the theory's social applications, including small markets, large markets, simple games and legislatures, symmetric and quota games, coalitions and power, and more.
This affordable new edition will be welcomed by economists, political scientists, historians, and anyone interested in multilateral negotiations or conflicts, as well as by general readers with an interest in mathematics, logic, or games.


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