'Combining rich historical detail with an innovative and broad ranging application of game theory, Aggarwal has brought penetrating new insight to the old issue of international debt negotiation. Nowhere will a reader find a more rewarding analysis of the strategic interaction between troubled debtors and their creditors. This is must reading for anyone interested in the complexities of international bargaining.'-Benjamin J. Cohen University of California, Santa Barbara

Preface; Overview; Part I. Argument: 1. Examining the importance of epochs; 2. Debt games and play: toward a model of debt rescheduling; 3. A situational theory of payoffs and intervention decisions; 4. A theory of situational change; Part II. Epoch 1: the 1820s to the 1860s: 5. The intersection of high and low politics: Mexican debt rescheduling, 1824 to 1867; 6. Guano makes the world go 'round: Peruvian debt rescheduling, 1823 to 1850s; Part III. Epoch 2: the 1860s to the 1910s: 7. From stability to chaos: Mexican debt rescheduling, 1867 to 1914; 8. To the victor go the spoils (and headaches): Peruvian debt rescheduling, 1875 to 1900s; Part IV. Epoch 3: the 1910s to the 1950s: 9. Riding on the storm: Mexican debt rescheduling, 1916 to 1942; 10. Years of false hope: Peruvian debt negotiations, 1930 to 1953; Part V. Epoch 4: the 1970s to the 1990s: 11. The good guys get tired: Mexico in the 1980s; 12. The politics of confrontation: Peru in the 1980s and 1990s; 13. Collision course: Argentina in the 1980s and 1990s; 14. The search for independence: Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s; Part VI. Implications: 15. Conclusion; Appendix; Bibliography.