During the 1990s, U.S. antitrust policy began to take greater account of economic theories that emphasize the critical role of innovation and change in the competitive process. Several high-profile antitrust cases have focused on dynamic innovation issues as much as or more than static economic efficiency. But does dynamic competition furnish a new rationale for activist antitrust, or a new reason for government to leave markets alone? In this volume, a dozen leading scholars with extensive antitrust experience explore this question in the context of the Microsoft case, merger policy, and intellectual property law.

Introduction; 1. A taxonomy of dynamic competition theories Jerry Ellig and Dan Lin; 2. Innovation and antitrust enforcement Daniel Rubinfeld and John Hoven; 3. Competence explanations of economic profits: some policy implications Jay B. Barney; 4. New Incidia for competition policy and market analysis in high-technology industries Christopher Pleatsikas and David Teece; 5. Technological standards, innovation, and the essential facility doctrine Richard N. Langlois; 6. Innovation and monopoly leveraging Franklin M. Fisher; 7. Competition in network industries: the Microsoft case Stan Liebowitz; 8. Intellectual property and limitations on contract: antitrust, preemption, and the first sale doctrine Michelle M. Burtis and Bruce H. Kobayashi; Conclusion.