Cognitive representation is the single most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind and has served as the corner-stone for the so-called 'cognitive revolution'. This book critically examines the ways in which philosophers and cognitive scientists appeal to representations in their theories, and argues that there is considerable confusion about the nature of representational states. This has led to an excessive over-application of the notion – especially in many of the newer theories in computational neuroscience. Representation Reconsidered shows how psychological research is actually moving in a non-representational direction, revealing a radical, though largely unnoticed, shift in our basic understanding of how the mind works.

List of figures; Preface; 1. Demands on a representational theory; 2. Representation in classical computational theories: the standard interpretation and its problems; 3. Two notions of representation in the classical computational framework; 4. The receptor notion and its problems; 5. Tacit representation and its problems; 6. Where is the representational paradigm headed?; References; Index.