Shows that electoral competition and partisan government helped balance the conflicting demands of voters' interests with the financial pressures generated by capital scarcity.

Maria Victoria Murillo is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Columbia University. She has been a faculty member at Yale University, a Fellow at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and a Peggy Rockefeller Fellow at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. She is the author of Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and co-editor of Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (2005). Her articles have appeared in numerous US and Latin American social science journals, and she was co-recipient of the Luebbert Award for the best article from the Comparative Politics Section of APSA in 2004.

1. Voice and light: the politics of telecommunications and electricity reform; 2. Political competition and policy adoption; 3. Casting a partisan light on regulatory choices; 4. Regulatory redistribution in post-reform Chile; 5. Post-reform regulatory redistribution in Argentina and Mexico; 6. A multilevel analysis of market reforms in Latin American public utilities; 7. Conclusion.