Bültmann & Gerriets
The Concept of Action
von N J Enfield, Jack Sidnell
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Reihe: New Departures in Anthropology
Gebundene Ausgabe
ISBN: 978-0-521-89528-6
Erschienen am 07.11.2017
Sprache: Englisch
Format: 243 mm [H] x 164 mm [B] x 16 mm [T]
Gewicht: 526 Gramm
Umfang: 242 Seiten

Preis: 120,50 €
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Biografische Anmerkung
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Klappentext

N. J. Enfield is Professor and Chair in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Sydney. His work on language and human sociality is based on regular field work in mainland Southeast Asia, especially Laos. He has published more than a dozen books and over 100 academic articles. Among his more recent books are Relationship Thinking: Agency, Enchrony, and Human Sociality (2013), Natural Causes of Language (2014), The Utility of Meaning (2015), and The Cambridge Handbook of Linguistic Anthropology (Cambridge, 2014, co-edited with Paul Kockelman and Jack Sidnell).



Preface; Acknowledgements; Part I. Preliminaries to Action: 1. Basics of action; 2. The study of action; Part II. The Nature of Action: 3. The distribution of action; 4. The ontology of action; Part III. Action and Human Diversity: 5. Collateral effects; 6. Natural meaning; Postface; Index.



When people do things with words, how do we know what they are doing? Many scholars have assumed a category of things called actions: 'requests', 'proposals', 'complaints', 'excuses'. The idea is both convenient and intuitive, but as this book argues, it is a spurious concept of action. In interaction, a person's primary task is to decide how to respond, not to label what someone just did. The labeling of actions is a meta-level process, appropriate only when we wish to draw attention to others' behaviors in order to quiz, sanction, praise, blame, or otherwise hold them to account. This book develops a new account of action grounded in certain fundamental ideas about the nature of human sociality: that social conduct is naturally interpreted as purposeful; that human behavior is shaped under a tyranny of social accountability; and that language is our central resource for social action and reaction.


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