In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talkabout groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals,thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that"Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Governmentbelieves that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", orthat "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We alsooften ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But couldgroups literally intend things? Is there such a thing as acollective mind? If so, should groups be held morally responsible?Such questions are of vital importance to our understanding of thesocial world.
In this lively, engaging introduction Deborah Tollefsen offers acareful survey of contemporary philosophers? answers to thesequestions, and argues for the unorthodox view that certain groupsshould, indeed, be treated as agents and deserve to be held morallyaccountable. Tollefsen explores the nature of belief, action andintention, and shows the reader how a belief in group agency can bereconciled with our understanding of individual agency andaccountability.
Groups as Agents will be a vital resource for scholars aswell as for students of philosophy and the social sciencesencountering the topic for the first time.