Uri Bar-Joseph is Professor of International Relations at Haifa University. He is the author of Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain and The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948.

Acknowledgments
Introduction

Part I. The Egyptian War Decision and Its Implementation

1. The War Decision

2. Planning the Next War: Past Experience and the Main Problems

Problem I: The Crossing of the Canal
Problem II: Egyptian Air Inferiority
Problem III: Inferiority in Armored Fighting

3. The Egyptian Deception Plan

i. The Role of Deception in Egyptian War Planning
ii. Passive Deception
iii. Active Deception
iv. Assessment of the Egyptian Deception

4. The Egyptian-Syrian War Coordination

Part II. Israel Prepares for War

5. The Balance of Forces¿the Israeli View

6. The Intelligence Conception and Its Sources

i. The Conception
ii. The Empirical Evidence

7. The Strategic Warning and Its Role in Israel's War Plans

8. The Next War Scenarios

9. The War Estimate: October 1972¿August 1973

i. October 1972¿April 1973
ii. April¿May 1973
iii. June¿August 1973

Part III. The Dynamics of an Intelligence Fiasco

10. August¿September 1973

11. Monday, October 1, 1973

12. Tuesday, October 2, 1973

13. Wednesday, October 3, 1973

14. Thursday, October 4, 1973

15. Friday, October 5, 1973

16. Saturday, October 6, 1973, 0400 ¿1400

17. Surprise

i. The Cabinet
ii. The Canal Front
iii. The Golan Front
iv. The Air Force

18. The Cost of Being Caught Unprepared

i. The Material Losses
ii. The Psychological Impact of Surprise

19. The Causes of the Intelligence Failure

i. Obstacles Unique to the Warning-Response Process
ii. Bureaucratic Obstacles
iii. Groupthinking
iv. Psychological Obstacles at the Individual Level
v. The Human Factor

Notes
Bibliography
Index