Edited by Ariel Buira, with a Foreword by J. A. Ocampo

List of Contributors; Foreword; 1. Introduction; 2. The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?; 3. Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy; 4. Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making; 5. Issues on IMF Governance and Represenation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options; 6. Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable; 7. Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations; 8. Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula; 9. Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach; 10. Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board; 11. Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote; 12. Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress

The papers included in this book cover different aspects of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. They explore different options for reform and show that enhancing the participation of developing and emerging market countries in resolving the major monetary and financial problems confronting the world economy, would improve global economic performance and contribute to the elimination of world poverty.