This book explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's National Intelligence Estimate that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons.

Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, USA. He is the author of many books, including Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (2010). He received his Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley, USA.

James J. Wirtz is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA. He recently completed co-editing the 7th edition of Strategy in the Contemporary World (2022). He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, USA.

Preface Introduction: How could getting it right go so wrong? The 2007 Iran NIE revisited PART I 1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities - Key judgments 2. CIA support to policymakers: the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions and capabilities 3. Reevaluating the 'externals' and 'internals' of the 2007 Iran nuclear NIE PART II 4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy 5. 2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story 6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the 2007 NIE on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 7. The November 2007 Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath PART III 8. Reflections on conveying uncertainty 9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications PART IV 10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the Iran nuclear threat 11. U.S.-Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an analysis of alternative policy options 12. Weapons of mass destruction: the issue of 'actionable' intelligence Epilogue: The rise of counter-proliferation intelligence