D. M. Armstrong

First published in 1961, Perception and the Physical World contends that there are insuperable difficulties for the Representative and Phenomenalist theories.

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Arguments to prove the sensible qualities subjective 2. What are the immediate objects of awareness in perception? 3. Refutation of the representative theory of perception 4. Some features of sense-impressions 5. Refutation of Phenomenalism (1) 6. Refutation of phenomenalism (2) 7. An analysis of sensory illusion 8. The argument from verification 9. The nature of perception 10. Consequences of our account of the nature of perception 11. The argument from causation 12. The argument from science 13. Direct realism without scientific phenomenalism 14. Problems about the secondary qualities 15. Can physical objects have nothing but the primary qualities? Conclusion Index