Tying the Autocrat's Hands provides a comprehensive, empirical evaluation of legal reforms in contemporary China.

1. Introduction; 2. A demand-side theory of authoritarian rule of law; 3. Authoritarian judiciary: how the party-state limits the rule of law; 4. State-business relations in China; 5. Who bribes?; 6. When do authoritarian rulers build less-corrupt courts?; 7. When do authoritarian rulers invest in courts?; 8. Conclusion.

Yuhua Wang is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His articles have appeared in the China Journal, the China Review, the China Quarterly, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, the Journal of Peking University (Beijing Daxue Xuebao), and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and has been featured in the New York Times, Reuters, and South China Morning Post, as well as on CNN and DR (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation).