An accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics, fully updated and now including a chapter on nondemocracy.

Figures and table; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1. Electoral competition under certainty; 2. Electoral competition under uncertainty; 3. Special interest politics; 4. Veto players; 5. Delegation; 6. Coalitions; 7. Political agency; 8. Nondemocracy; 9. Regime change; References; Author index; Subject index.

Scott Gehlbach is Professor, Department of Political Science and Harris School of Public Policy, at the University of Chicago. A political economist and comparativist, Gehlbach has made numerous contributions to the study of autocracy, economic reform, and political connections, among other topics. He is the author or coauthor of Reform and Rebellion in Weak States (Cambridge Elements in Political Economy), Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), and many articles in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics. His work has been supported by the National Science Foundation, two Fulbright-Hays Fellowships, and many other grants. Gehlbach received his Ph.D. in political science and economics from the University of California, Berkeley.