Rather than an unintended by-product of poor state capacity, weak political and legal institutions are often weak by design.

1. Theorizing weak institutions; 2. When (electoral) opportunity knocks: weak institutions, political shocks, and electoral reforms in Latin America; 3. The stickiness of 'bad' institutions: constitutional continuity and change under democracy; 4. Presidential crises in Latin America; 5. Coercion gaps; 6. Aspirational laws as weak institutions: legislation to combat violence against women in Mexico; 7. The social determinants of enforcement: integrating politics with limited state capacity; 8. A multilevel approach to enforcement: forest protection in the Argentine Chaco; 9. What/whose property rights? The selective enforcement of land rights under Mexican liberalism; 10. Imported institutions: boon or bane in the developing world? 11. Social origins of institutional strength: prior consultation over extraction of hydrocarbons in Bolivia; 12. Conclusion.