Offers a theory of compliance and authority that wouild be applicable to behavior concerning economic contracts, law, enforcement, and international relations. It examiones the problem of compliance in centralized (e.g. national and state laws) and decentralized (international treaties) systems. Applies the theory to explain the level of compliance with Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty anf the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention.

Originally published in 1979

Chapter 1 The problem of compliance; Part I A special theory of compliance; Chapter 2 The calculus of the actor; Chapter 3 Compliance in the international system; Part II Applications to international politics; Chapter 4 Compliance without organization: the Part Ial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Chapter 5 Decentralized institutions: the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention; Part III Toward a more general theory of compliance; Chapter 6 The problem of compliance reconsidered; Chapter 7 The behavior of public authorities; Chapter 8 Externalities of compliance mechanisms;