This edited volume addresses the main lessons and legacies of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

David Gioe is a PhD candidate at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and previously spent a decade working in the US intelligence community.

Len Scott is Professor of International History and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University.

Christopher Andrew is Emeritus Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Cambridge and a former visiting Professor of National Strategy and the Harvard University.

1. Introduction, Len Scott, David Gioe, and Christopher Andrew 2. 'Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis', Christopher Andrew 3. 'Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War', Len Scott 4. 'The BBC Public Service and Private Worlds: How the Corporation Informed the Public, Related to Government and Understood the Cuban Missile Crisis', Jean Seaton and Rosaleen Hughes 5. 'Modifying 'A Very Dangerous Message: Britain, the Non-Aligned, and the UN during the Cuban Missile Crisis', Peter Catterall 6. 'The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Cuban Missile Crisis', Michael S. Goodman 7. 'Trial By Fire: A New Perspective on Military Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis', Michael B. Petersen 8. 'Handling HERO: Joint Anglo-American Tradecraft in the Case of Oleg Penkovsky', David Gioe 9. 'What Really Happened in R.A.F. Bomber Command during the Cuban Missile Crisis?', Robin Woolven 10. 'Leading from Behind: Anglo-American Diplomacy and Third Party Mediation during the Cuban Missile Crisis', Toshihiko Aono 11. 'The Australian Government and the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Antipodean Perspective', Laura Stanley 12. 'Italian Political Reactions to the Cuban Missile Crisis', Leonardo Campus 13. 'The Fourth Question: Why Did John F. Kennedy Offer Up the Jupiters in Turkey?', Don Munton 14. Perception of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Russia Today, Neil Kent and Yan Naumkin