Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government's strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1945 to 1964. This volume, written with full access to the UK documentary record, examines the strategic nuclear policy of British governments after 1945 as they tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic capability, while also attempting to forge a close nuclear relationship with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

Matthew Jones is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and author of, amongst other books, After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 (2010).

Preface

1. The making of a deterrent force, August 1945-November 1957

2. The rise of ballistic missile defence

3. In the shadow of Sputnik: The nuclear sufficiency debate and the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration, March 1957-February 1959

4. Breaking the impasse? Polaris and deterrent policy, February 1959-March 1960

5. The future nuclear programme and the cancellation of Blue Streak, December 1959-April 1960

6. Skybolt, Polaris and the control of Western nuclear forces, March 1960-May 1961

7. An arms race intensifies: ABM defence, nuclear testing, and the criteria of deterrence, January 1961-January 1962

8. Revising the criteria, January-May 1962

9. The prelude to Nassau, June-December 1962

10. Securing Polaris: The Nassau negotiations, December 1962 - January 1963

11. The path to the Polaris Sales Agreement, January - April 1963

12. The origins of a Polaris improvement programme: HR 169 and the emergence of the Moscow ABM system

13. The MLF, the size of the Polaris force, and the approach of the general election, May 1963 - October 1964