This volume comprises a selection of essays by Prof. James Wirtz on the theory of surprise in intelligence studies. Bringing these previously published articles and book chapters together in a single volume, makes it possible to draw the reader's attention to the theoretical and practical connections between strategic surprise and deterrence failure, and to introduce practical techniques for avoiding strategic surprise.

Preface

Introduction

1. Theory of Surprise

Part I: The Theory of Surprise Applied

2. Surprise at the Top of the World

3. Surprise and the Non-State Actor

4. Déjà Vu? Comparing Pearl Harbor and 9/11

Part II: Surprise and Deterrence Failure

5. The Balance of Power Paradox

6. Deterring the Weak: Problems and Prospects

Part III: Avoiding Surprise: Toward a New Intelligence Doctrine

7. Red Teaming Surprise

8. Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty

9. From Combined Arms to Combined Intelligence: Philosophy, Doctrine and Operations

10. Conclusion

James J. Wirtz is Professor and Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, and author/editor of numerous books, including, most recently, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, 4th edition (ed., with Loch Johnson, 2015).