This paper argues that the development and implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power is critical to success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The paper discusses the flaws in declaring war on the method of terrorism rather than focusing on the actors or insurgents that use these methods. The paper analyzes Al-Qaida using the characteristics of successful insurgencies posed by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen in "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response." The analysis of the underlying social, economic and political conditions that support an insurgency, Al-Qaida's ideology, leadership and strategy, and the sources of support that enable an insurgency provide valuable insights in developing a strategy to defeat it. A review of the National Strategy for Countering Terrorism demonstrates an incongruence that limits its effectiveness as a blueprint for counterinsurgency. Recommendations include: the formation of a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee to develop, implement and assess a counterinsurgency strategy integrating all aspects of national power; the reformation and revitalization of the executive branch, specifically the Department of State; and the development of military leaders with critical thinking skills and breadth of knowledge.